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Experimentally Testing the Effectiveness of Human
Rights Treaties
Adam S. Chilton ∗

Abstract
International human rights law is a field concerned with causality. While scholars in other
fields argue about how laws can be changed to maximize their effectiveness, scholars of
international human rights law still regularly debate whether the major international agreements
have had any effect on state behavior. Part of the reason that this threshold question is still
contested is that there are a number of barriers to causal inference that make answering it with
observational data incredibly difficult. Given these obstacles to using observational data, and the
importance of the topic, scholars have begun to use experimental methods to study the effects of
commitments to human rights agreements. This Essay discusses the motivations behind the
limited experimental work on human rights, the mechanisms that are being tested, and the
findings of this emerging literature.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
International human rights law is a field concerned with causality. While
scholars in other fields argue about how laws can be changed to maximize their
effectiveness, scholars of international human rights law still regularly debate
whether major international agreements have had any effect on state behavior.
Some scholars have examined empirical records and concluded that under the
right conditions, the ratification of human rights treaties is associated with
improved human rights practices, 1 but others have found that the ratification of
human rights treaties does not have any influence on the likelihood that states will
violate human rights. 2
One thing that scholars agree on, however, is that if international human
rights treaties were to change state behavior, it would not be because of the usual
mechanism that drives compliance with international law: reciprocity. 3 This is
because one state’s failure to respect the rights of its citizens cannot be corrected
by another state reciprocally violating the rights of its own citizens. As a result,
scholars have examined other mechanisms—including domestic politics,
empathetic enforcement by powerful states, pressure from international treaty
bodies, and the influence of non-governmental organizations—that may lead
ratification of human rights agreements to result in changes to state behavior.
After over a decade of empirical research on the effectiveness of human rights
treaties, however, there is disagreement on whether each of these alternative
mechanisms leads to improved rights practices.

1

2

3

For research that concludes that human rights treaties improve human rights practices, see Yonatan
Lupu, Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights
Agreements, 67 INT’L ORG. 469 (2013); Yonatan Lupu, Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of
International Human Rights Agreements, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 578 (2015); Daniel W. Hill, Estimating the
Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior, 72 J. POL. 1161 (2010); BETH A. SIMMONS,
MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009).
For research that concludes that human rights treaties either have no (or at least a very small) effect
on human rights practices, see, for example, Daniel W. Hill, Jr. & Zachary M. Jones, An Empirical
Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 661 (2014); ERIC A. POSNER,
THE TWILIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton &
Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC.
1373 (2005); Eric. Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?,
49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925 (2005); Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L. J. 1935 (2002); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Does It Make A Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999).
See SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 123 (“Human rights regimes do not involve reciprocal compliance. . . .
No government is likely to alter its own rights practice to reciprocate for abuses elsewhere.”);
POSNER, supra note 2, at 79 (“In the case of ordinary treaties, the main reason that states comply
with their obligations is that they fear that if they do not, other treaty parties will violate their own
obligations. . . . [T]his logic does not easily carry over to human rights treaties.”).
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This lack of consensus is in part due to the substantial obstacles that stand
in the way of using observational data to study the causal effect of human rights
treaties on state practices. 4 Perhaps the most difficult of these obstacles to
overcome is the fact that states are not randomly assigned commitments to human
rights treaties, but instead select agreements based on their expected behavior.
There is near universal ratification of the major human rights agreements, and
most states have also subjected themselves to a series of overlapping international
and domestic legal obligations that all seek to protect human rights. Furthermore,
convincing evidence has recently emerged showing that the data used by
researchers to measure human rights practices is systematically biased because of
changes in standards used for reporting human rights abuses over time. 5 It has
proven difficult enough to design an observational study that accounts for one of
these problems, but designing a study that accounts for all of them simultaneously
has so far proven to be close to impossible.
Given these obstacles to using observational data, and the importance of the
topic, scholars have begun to use experimental methods to study the effects of
commitments to human rights agreements. This is because experimental studies
can be designed to test the plausibility of the mechanisms theorized as ways that
the ratification of human rights treaties may change state behavior. Although
experimental methods are unlikely to definitively establish whether international
treaties improve human rights outcomes, the handful of experimental studies
conducted to date have found that information on commitments to international
agreements does have a modest impact on public opinion. 6 By doing so, these

4

The difficulties that arise when trying to empirically test compliance with human rights treaties have
been well documented. For a general overview, see Adam S. Chilton & Dustin Tingley, Why the
Study of International Law Needs Experiments, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 173 (2013). For a discussion
focused on the problems posed by selection bias, see Yonatan Lupu, The Informative Power of Treaty
Commitment: Using the Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 912 (2013). For a
discussion of the bias in efforts to measure human rights violations, see Christopher J. Fariss, Respect
for Human Rights Has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability, 108 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 297 (2014). For critical comments of approaches that have been used in the literature, see
Eric A. Posner, Some Skeptical Comments on Beth Simmons’s “Mobilizing for Human Rights,” 44 NYU J.
INT’L L. & POL. 819 (2012).

5

See Fariss, supra note 4.
Experiments studying international human rights law include: Adam S. Chilton, The Influence of
International Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion: An Experimental Study, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 110
(2014); Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, Martial Law? Military Experience, International Law, and Support for
Torture, 58 INT’L STUD. Q. 501 (2014); Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes
Toward Torture: An Experimental Study, 67 INT’L ORG. 105 (2013); Michael Tomz & Jessica L. P.
Weeks, Human Rights, Democracy, and Public Support for War (Working Paper, Mar. 2015),
https://perma.cc/RLA5-78SU; Tonya L. Putnam & Jacob N. Shapiro, International Law and Voter
Preferences: The Case of Foreign Human Rights Violations, HUM. RTS. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 7, 2017),
http://perma.cc/27L9-KTPD; Michael Tomz, Reputation and the Effect of International Law on
Preferences and Beliefs (Working Paper, Feb. 2008), https://perma.cc/Q6WF-48LW.

6
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studies have provided some qualified support for the theorized mechanisms
through which treaties may improve human rights.
There are, however, several reasons why these experiments have extremely
limited generalizability. This is not only because of the general problem that
subjects often behave differently in experimental settings than they do in the real
world, but also because the human rights experiments that have been conducted
to date have largely relied on surveys administered to samples of Americans. As a
result, although the evidence produced by these studies is informative, it does not
offer any conclusive answers on whether human rights treaties change state
behavior.
That said, these early studies have demonstrated that using experimental
methods to study human rights may help bring new evidence to this important
debate. Future work should build upon this foundation by expanding: the
countries in which experiments are conducted; the topics that are studied; and the
type of experiments being conducted. By building on existing studies in this way,
experimental research on human rights may be able to provide crucial evidence
that supplements what has been produced using observational research methods.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Section II discusses mechanisms that may
lead states to improve their human rights practices as a result of signing human
rights agreements. Section III summarizes the evidence from observational
studies on whether those mechanisms have led states to improve their human
rights practices. Section IV outlines why observational studies face difficulties
trying to empirically test the effects of human rights treaties. Section V presents
experimental studies that have tried to examine the effect of human rights
agreements. Section VI discusses future directions that experimental research on
human rights should take.

II. T HEORIES OF C OMPLIANCE
A central question in the study of international law is whether states change
their behavior because of commitments to international agreements. 7 This
question has taken on unique importance in the human rights context because the
mechanism that drives compliance in many areas of international law—
reciprocity—is not present. 8 In most areas of international law, the logical
7

8

For an example of the debate, compare Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance,
47 INT’L ORG. 175 (1993) with George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the
Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996).
For longer discussions of the role of reciprocity in compliance with international law, see JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); ERIC A. POSNER &
ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013). In an example of an
empirical work that explores the effects of reciprocity, JAMES D. MORROW, ORDER WITHIN
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response to State A breaking a commitment is for State B to apply pressure on
State A to change its behavior by reciprocating. 9 For example, if State A were to
violate an investment agreement by blocking firms from State B from acquiring
their domestic companies, State B can respond by doing the same thing to firms
from State A. 10 In the human rights context, however, the same logic does not
hold. 11 Unlike investment agreements, if State A were to torture its citizens in
violation of an international human rights treaty, State B will not try to convince
State A to change course by torturing its own citizens. The implication is that
although it is possible that international human rights treaties have helped to
improve human rights practices, it is not because of the possibility of reciprocity.
Instead, for commitments to human rights treaties to produce changes in state
behavior, it would have to be through mechanisms other than reciprocity.
Figure 1 illustrates some of the mechanisms through which commitments to
international human rights treaties could result in changes to state behavior. The
solid lines represent the commitments that states make to human rights treaties. 12
The dashed lines represent four mechanisms that might create pressure for states
to change their human rights practices after having signed a human rights treaty:
(1) ratification changes the domestic politics of countries that are at least partially
democratic; (2) other countries coercing states to comply with their commitments;
(3) treaty bodies pressuring the state to improve its human rights practices; and
(4) non-governmental organizations (NGOs) advocating for compliance.

ANARCHY: THE LAWS OF WAR AS AN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION (2014) shows that reciprocity
drives compliance with the laws of war.
9
10

11
12

See POSNER, supra note 2, at 79.
See, for example, Dustin Tingley, Christopher Xu, Adam S. Chilton, & Helen Milner, The Political
Economy of Inward FDI: Opposition to Chinese Mergers and Acquisitions, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 27 (2015)
(finding that the U.S. is more likely to block attempts by Chinese companies to acquire American
firms when China has previously blocked American companies in the same industries).
See POSNER, supra note 2, at 79–82; SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 122.
The exact reason that states choose to commit to human rights treaties is a subject of debate. For
example, it may be the case that states make commitments because of domestic considerations, or
it may be the case that states sign agreements because they are persuaded to do so by other states
with either carrots or sticks. For discussions of the topic, see POSNER, supra note 2, at 59–68;
POSNER & SYKES, supra note 8, at 202–06; SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 57–111. For a recent empirical
consideration of this topic, see Richard A. Nielsen & Beth A. Simmons, Rewards for Ratification:
Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime, 59 INT’L STUD. Q. 179 (2015).

Summer 2017

169

Chicago Journal of International Law

Figure 1: Mechanisms Through Which Human Rights Treaties May
Change State Behavior

3

4

2

1

A. Domestic Politics
The primary mechanism that has been theorized as driving compliance with
human rights treaties—illustrated by the dashed loop below State A—is that
ratification of human rights treaties may change the domestic political landscape
of partially democratic countries in ways that make it easier for activists and
opposition political parties to lobby for improved rights practices. 13 For all but the
most powerful states, new human rights treaties create exogenous shocks to
countries’ domestic agendas that force governments to decide whether to sign the
treaty and make a public commitment to human rights. This shock may create an
opening for domestic groups to lobby for improved rights practices, and if the
agreement is signed, it may improve the ability of domestic groups to pressure the
government to live up to the commitments it made. This pressure may come in
many forms. For example, it may be human rights activists bringing litigation to
try and have the courts pressure the government to bring human rights practices
13

For a discussion of the ways that ratifying human rights agreements may influence domestic politics
and thus lead to changes in state behavior, see SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 125–48.
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into compliance with the treaty, or it may be opposition political parties attacking
the government for failure to live up to prior international commitments.

B. Empathetic Enforcement
A second mechanism that may drive compliance with human rights
treaties—illustrated by the dashed lines between countries—is “empathetic
enforcement” by powerful states. 14 Although states are not obligated to apply
strong pressure on repressive states to comply with human rights agreements, they
may choose to do so. This pressure could come in many forms. For example,
developed countries might condition foreign aid upon recipient states improving
human rights practices, or be more likely to militarily intervene in countries that
violate human rights commitments they have made. If powerful states were more
likely to apply these forms of pressure against repressive states that had previously
committed to human rights treaties, this would be one way that treaty
commitment could lead to improved rights practices.

C. Treaty Body Pressure
A third mechanism that may drive compliance with human rights
agreements—illustrated by the dashed line from the treaty to the states—is
pressure applied by the international treaty bodies themselves. 15 By voluntarily
signing onto international human rights agreements, states subject themselves to
monitoring by treaty bodies. The treaty bodies then have the power to produce
reports that recommend ways for the states to improve human rights, or to issue
statements chastising states for failure to live up to their commitments. Although
the international treaty bodies cannot back up these statements with explicit
sanctions, the reports may indirectly influence human rights practices.

D. NGO Advocacy
A fourth mechanism that may lead states to improve human rights practices
after ratifying international agreements—illustrated by the dashed line from the
NGOs to State A—is the influence of non-governmental organizations. 16 There
are a large number of NGOs dedicated to trying to improve human rights
14

I borrow the term “empathetic enforcement” from Beth Simmons. See SIMMONS, supra note 1, at
116. This mechanism is also often referred to simply as “coercion” by powerful states. For a
discussion of the mechanism and examples of where it has been used, see GOLDSMITH & POSNER,
supra note 8, at 115–17.

15

It is worth noting that scholars have largely been skeptical that this mechanism could actually lead
states to change their behavior. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 95–104; EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON,
MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY 44–66 (2013); SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 121–25.
For a discussion of the role that NGOs can play in promoting human rights, see HAFNER-BURTON,
supra note 15, at 151–63. For skepticism about this possibility, see POSNER, supra note 2, at 82.

16
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practices around the world. This includes organizations that cover a broad range
of issues like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as
organizations focused on specific issue areas. These organizations use a range of
tactics to pressure governments to improve their rights practices. These tactics
include filing reports with treaty bodies, lobbying powerful governments to
pressure repressive states, and naming and shaming states that violate human
rights.

III. E VIDENCE F ROM O BSERVATIONAL S TUDIES
Despite years of scholarship researching the four mechanisms discussed in
the previous Section, it is still disputed whether any of the four are viable channels
through which treaty commitments may result in improved human rights
practices. In this Section, I will briefly discuss some of the empirical research that
has used observational data to test whether these four mechanisms have caused
states to change their behavior. 17
First, empirical research has examined whether domestic political
mechanisms may lead states to improve their human rights practices after ratifying
international treaties. In the most prominent research testing this theory, Beth
Simmons tested the effectiveness of thirteen human rights treaties. 18 Simmons
found evidence that ratification was associated with improved human rights
practices for seven of the thirteen agreements. Simmons’ research did not,
however, suggest that the effectiveness of ratification was consistent for all
countries. Instead, Simmons found that ratification of human rights treaties is not
associated with improved human rights in stable democracies or stable
autocracies, but is associated with better rights practices in transitioning
democracies. According to Simmons, the reason that transitioning democracies
change their behavior after ratifying human rights treaties is that the existence of
the agreement helps domestic groups pressure their governments to be more
respectful of rights. In addition to Simmons’ research, two recent empirical studies
by political scientist Yonathan Lupu have used sophisticated empirical techniques
to test whether domestic mechanisms increase the effectiveness of human rights
treaties. Lupu’s studies have found that compliance with the International
17

A complete survey of the empirical human rights literature is beyond the scope of this Essay. For
a short introduction to the empirical literature on human rights, see Adam S. Chilton & Eric A.
Posner, The Influence of History on States’ Compliance with Human Rights Obligations, 56 VA. J. INT’L L.
211 (2016). For more thorough reviews, see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, A Social Science of Human
Rights, 51 J. PEACE RES. 273 (2014); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, International Regimes for Human Rights,
15 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 265 (2012); Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in
International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 19–25 (2012); Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance
and Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 273 (2010).

18

SIMMONS, supra note 1.
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has increased when there are
more veto points in the state’s legislature, 19 or when there is an independent
judiciary that can evaluate claims that certain rights are being violated. 20 Although
Simmons’ and Lupu’s research has produced perhaps the most promising
evidence that committing to human rights treaties may drive states to change their
behavior, it is worth noting that it has been suggested that these studies at best
show that ratification has made a marginal improvement in rights practices for a
small number of countries on a handful of issues. 21
Second, empirical research has tested whether empathetic enforcement
might cause states to improve their human rights behavior. One body of research
testing this theory has examined whether aid donors have punished states that
violate human rights by withholding aid. 22 Although that line of scholarship has
produced mixed results, in the most recent research on the topic, political scientist
Richard Nielsen found that states only selectively sanction human rights violators.
That is, although aid is sometimes withheld from states that violate human rights,
“[d]onors seem willing to abandon human rights norms when their friends and
allies violate human rights.” 23 Based on this finding and other similar research,
scholars have largely been skeptical that states would actually improve their human
rights practices because of rewards or punishments from more powerful
countries. 24
Third, there has been limited research trying to test whether pressure from
human rights treaty bodies leads states to improve their human rights practices.
Since human rights bodies do not have any strong enforcement powers and
countries do not uniformly take their obligations to report to human rights bodies

19
20

21
22

23
24

Lupu, Legislative Veto Players, supra note 1.
Lupu, Best Evidence, supra note 1. Lupu’s claim is that the presence of an independent judiciary
increases respect for the ICCPR for civil rights, but not for physical integrity rights. The theory
Lupu puts forward to explain this finding is that an independent judiciary can police rights violations
for issue areas where the standards, proof, or evidence production costs are low. For another
empirical paper that considers the effectiveness of domestic legal institutions on compliance with
human rights agreements, see Emilia Justyna Powell & Jeffery K. Stanton, Domestic Judicial Institutions
and Human Rights Treaty Violations, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 149 (2009).
POSNER, supra note 2, at 76–78.
Richard A Nielsen, Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions Against Repressive States. 57 INT’L
STUD. Q. 791, 791–92 (2013).
Id. at 791.
See SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 116 (“If we are looking for empathetic enforcement [of human rights
treaties] from other countries, we will be looking in vain for a long time.”); POSNER, supra note 2,
at 80–81 (“Even powerful countries often cannot exert sufficient pressure on a human rights
violator to cause it to improve its behavior, because the target of sanctions can often retaliate by
improving its ties with the sanctioning countries’ rivals.”).
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seriously, 25 it is perhaps unsurprising that few scholars have tried to link activities
of human rights bodies to improved rights practices. In one study on the topic,
James Lebovic and Erik Voeten tested whether resolutions condemning a state’s
human rights practices passed by the U.N. Commissions on Human Rights
(UNCHR) resulted in that state receiving lower levels of foreign aid. 26 Their study
found that resolutions condemning human rights practices are associated with
states receiving lower amounts of aid from multilateral organizations like the
World Bank, but that resolutions condemning human rights practices are not
associated with aggregate bilateral aid. Even if UNCHR resolutions result in lower
foreign aid, however, it does not necessarily follow that the resolutions cause
improvements in human rights. As a result, despite this finding, Beth Simmons
has argued that “[n]o one has shown any significant external enforcement behind
the provisions of international human rights treaties of a kind that might plausibly
account for the patterns of compliance observed across a number of rights
areas.” 27
Fourth, a handful of empirical studies have tried to test whether pressure
from NGOs has led to improved human rights practices. This research has
focused on whether efforts to “name and shame” countries for violation of
human rights has led to better practices. In what is perhaps the most widely cited
study on the subject, Emilie Hafner-Burton found that efforts to spotlight human
rights violations by NGOs are associated with increased repression. 28 HafnerBurton explains this finding by arguing that oppressive governments have
incentive to crack down on opposition groups after they are empowered by the
attention created by international organizations. In contrast to Hafner-Burton’s
finding, Anna Schrimpf found that there is likely no relationship (but perhaps a
positive relationship) between NGO attention and human rights practices. 29
Finally, in related research, Judith Kelley and Beth Simmons found that including
states on “watch lists” is associated with those states being likely to then
criminalize human trafficking. 30

25

See Cosette Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights: Quality of Participation in the
Convention Against Torture, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 579 (2015).

26

James H. Lebovic & Erik Voeten, The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and Foreign Aid in the
Punishing of Human Rights Violations, 46 J. PEACE RES. 79 (2009).

27

Simmons, supra note 17, at 291.
Emilie Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L
ORG. 689 (2008).
Anna Schrimpf, Does INGO Activism Improve Human Rights Practices? Evidence from a Multi-Issue Analysis
(Working Paper 2014).
Judith G. Kelley & Beth A. Simmons, Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International
Relations, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 55 (2015).

28

29

30

174

Vol. 18 No. 1

Experimentally Testing Human Rights Treaties

Chilton

IV. B ARRIERS TO C AUSAL I NFERENCE W ITH
O BSERVATIONAL D ATA
As the preceding discussion hopefully made clear, a consensus among
empirical researchers has not emerged on the question of whether ratification of
international human rights agreements improves state behavior. Although this is
likely in part because empirical scholarship on international law is relatively new,
it is also because there are a number of factors that make it incredibly difficult to
study the causal effects of human rights treaties using observational data. 31
First, observational research on human rights treaties has difficulty
accounting for selection bias. Selection bias exists when the assignment of a
treatment variable is systematically related to the dependent variable of interest.
For example, if the subjects given Drug X in a clinical trial were picked to receive
the drug because they were the healthiest subjects in the group, any positive effect
of the drug may be attributable to the fact that the receipt of the Drug X (the
treatment) was related to likely health outcomes (the dependent variable). The
same problem exists in studying human rights treaties. Countries do not enter into
treaties randomly. Instead, countries voluntarily choose to enter into human rights
agreements based on their preferences and planned policies. To be clear, it might
be the case that countries decide to enter into agreements when they do not plan
on complying, or that they enter into the agreements when they do. Either is
problematic for empirical research. Although empirical researchers have
developed strategies to try and account for this selection bias, 32 ultimately there is
only so much that can be done given the fact that countries voluntarily opt into
human rights regimes and thus any later human rights practices are endogenous
to the decision to ratify the treaties.

31

32

The following discussion is based on Chilton & Tingely, supra note 4. The discussion in Chilton &
Tingley uses human rights law and international humanitarian law to make a broader point about
empirical research in international law and also develops the arguments discussed here more fully.
Additionally, the data in this essay was originally presented in Chilton & Tingley, supra note 4.
For an excellent discussion of the ways that researchers have tried to account for selection bias
while studying international law, see Lupu, supra note 4.
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Figure 2: Number of Countries Party to Major Human
Rights Treaties

Second, even if it were possible to account for selection bias, a basic
requirement of causal inference is variance. Simply put, there must be variance in
the explanatory variable of interest to be able to assess the impact that it has on a
given dependent variable. For example, if everyone that contracted a new disease
was given Drug X, it would be impossible to know the effectiveness of Drug X
(which is exactly why clinical trials randomly give some subjects placebos). This
basic requirement of causal inference is a major hurdle for studying human rights
treaties because there is very little variance in applicability of the major
international human rights agreements (and no variance in the applicability of the
parts of human rights law that are considered part of customary international law).
As Figure 2 shows, nearly every country has signed onto the major human rights
treaties. To further illustrate this point, the red line is the number of countries that
are currently members of the U.N. Since there are very few countries that are not
party to the major human rights agreements, and countries that are not party to
the agreement are likely not representative of the countries where human rights
agreements are likely to have an effect, it is thus very difficult to understand the
effectiveness of these agreements on human rights practices.
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Figure 3: Ratification History of Major Human Rights Agreements

Third, the current lack of variance in ratification of major human rights
treaties would not be as much of a problem if historically there had been variance
in which countries were party to the treaties. If that were the case, it would be
possible to study the period between when the treaty had opened for ratification
and when nearly all countries joined the agreements. For the first major human
rights treaties, this was the case. As Figure 3 shows, countries continued to ratify
the Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) for
the entire latter half of the twentieth century. 33 As Figure 3 also shows, however,
more recent human rights treaties have been ratified incredibly quickly. For
example, the most recent major human rights treaty—the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC)—became widely adopted in about five years. 34
Although these increasingly short ratification windows may be a positive
development for the human rights movement, they are problematic for human
33

It is important to note that the number of countries in the world also dramatically increased during
this period. As a result, Figure 3 may suggest there was more variance in early years than there
actually was. For example, in the early 1980s, when roughly 120 countries were party to the CERD,
approximately 150 countries were members of the U.N.

34

In another example, 159 countries have signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD) since it opened for signature in 2007. Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, May 30, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S., available at https://perma.cc/Q5LE-7HA9.
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rights researchers who need longer windows before widespread ratification to
study.
Figure 4: Countries that Have Made Commitments to Eliminate Torture

Fourth, another difficulty with conducting empirical research on the
effectiveness of human rights treaties is that countries frequently have overlapping
legal obligations. The problem is that it is only possible to understand the effect
of a given variable if it is possible to isolate it from other variables that may be
driving the outcome of interest. For example, if everyone that contracted a new
disease were given both Drug X and Drug Y, it would be impossible to isolate the
effects of Drug X and the effects of Drug Y (not to mention the effect of their
interaction). The same problem often exists with international legal commitments.
Countries often have signed multiple agreements that regulate human rights
practices, have joined multiple organizations that monitor human rights
compliance, and also have domestic laws that prohibit the same conduct as the
international agreement. To illustrate this point, Figure 4 shows the number of
countries that have signed the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the number
of countries that have provisions in their constitutions that prohibit torture. 35 As
the figure shows, there is nearly the same number of countries with each
restriction as of 2015. These kinds of overlaps can make it difficult to tell whether

35

For information on the data on constitutional torture prohibitions used in this figure, see Adam S.
Chilton & Mila Versteeg, The Failure of Constitutional Torture Prohibitions, 44 J. L. STUDIES 417 (2015).
For another discussion of this issue, see Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, International Law,
Constitutional Law, and Public Support for Torture, 3 RES. & POL. 1 (2016).
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changes (for better or worse) in human rights practices are attributable to
international treaties or other sources of law.
Fifth, beyond the previous four concerns related to the ratification of human
rights treaties, it is also the case that there are frequently only flawed measures of
human rights practices available to use as dependent variables. Human rights
treaties seek to protect a large number of rights. In fact, as Figure 5 shows, the
number of rights protected by individual treaties ranges from eleven to fifty-eight.
Currently, however, there is only data available on a handful of rights for a large
number of countries. The result is that it is difficult to know whether a given treaty
has improved rights because there are not good measures for all of the rights that
any given treaty tries to protect.
Figure 5: Number of Rights Protected in Major Human
Rights Agreements

Moreover, even if there was unbiased data for one of these rights—say the
right of freedom of speech—it might be the case that the treaty improves
protection for that right while making things worse for another dozen rights. That
said, it is likely the case that all of the current data sources are biased. Recent
research has shown that the most widely used dataset for human rights—the CIRI
dataset—is systematically biased because reporting standards have changed over
time. 36 This not only calls into question the results of studies that have relied on
36

See Fariss, supra note 4. The CIRI dataset uses State Department and Amnesty International Reports
to code the human rights practices of countries on a 3-point scale. Fariss, however, uses a
sophisticated empirical model to show that these widely-used scores are biased because the
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the CIRI data, 37 but also suggests that any other research that uses data on rights
practices based on reports may be biased as well. Since the data on human rights
practices has been shown to be biased and only covers a few rights, taken together
these facts should make it clear that it is difficult to use conventional methods of
empirical research to study the effectiveness of human rights agreements.

V. E XPERIMENTAL E VI DENCE
One advantage of experimental research is that experiments can be designed
to help test the mechanisms discussed in Section II that have been theorized as
driving compliance with human rights agreements while accounting for the
barriers to inference discussed in Section IV. Of course, my claim is not that
experiments can address all of these problems at once. 38 Instead, they can bring
new evidence to evaluate the effectiveness of human rights agreements. To date,
experimental studies have been designed to test the plausibility of all of the four
mechanisms that were previously outlined: (1) domestic politics; (2) empathetic
enforcement; (3) treaty body pressure; and (4) NGO advocacy.

A. Domestic Politics
There have been at least two experiments conducted that tested whether
prior commitments to international agreements increased support for policy
reforms that would make a state comply with its human rights obligations. In the
first experiment designed to test this mechanism, Wallace conducted a survey on
American adults to determine whether information on prior commitments to
international law decreased support for torture. 39 The survey told respondents that
the U.S. often captures combatants from the opposing side during conflicts, and
that those combatants may have information on future attacks. The survey further
told respondents that some officials believe that using interrogation methods that
include torture on the combatants may be a useful way to obtain information on

37

reporting standards have changed over time. Although Fariss also has created an unbiased single
measure of “repression” that can be used as a dependent variable, it is only one variable that does
not cover all of the rights that treaties try to protect.
This is not a criticism of scholars that have used the CIRI data in their research (which I readily
admit to being one of); using the CIRI data is a completely reasonable decision, given that it is the
data source with the broadest coverage available. After Fariss, supra note 4, however, scholars
should be aware of the limitations with the CIRI data and any other dataset that uses reports on
human rights to code countries.

38

Of course, experimental research has problems of its own—the most notable of which being
external validity. The limitations of experimental research are briefly discussed in Section VI, infra.

39

Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture, supra note 6. A companion paper also
analyzes the results of this experiment, but focuses on whether there is a differential treatment
effect for respondents with military experience. See Wallace, Martial Law, supra note 6.
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future attacks. The survey then randomly told half of the sample that those
interrogation methods would violate international law and treaties that the U.S.
had previously committed to. 40 After reading this information, respondents were
asked whether they supported the use of interrogation techniques that include
torture. Wallace found that respondents given information on international law
treatment were six percent less supportive of using torture than the respondents
who did not receive the information. This survey suggests that even on an issue
where people have strong views, information on international law can have a
statistically significant effect on the views of Americans.
The second study designed to test the Domestic Politics mechanism is
Chilton. 41 Chilton also conducted a survey on a sample of American adults to test
the effect of information about international law, but made two changes to the
design used by Wallace. First, the survey focused on a purely domestic topic to
reduce the possibility that respondents changed their view in light of international
law because they thought that retaliations may result from non-compliance.
Second, the survey included a placebo treatment to see whether the legal
commitments, instead of the general idea of human rights, is what lowered
support for violations of human rights treaties. The survey specifically focused on
the use of solitary confinement in American prisons. Respondents were told that
solitary confinement is often used in American prisons, and that supporters of the
practice argue that it is necessary to maintain prison discipline. There were then
three randomly assigned treatments: the control group was not given any
information on human rights; the placebo group was told that critics argue that
the use of solitary confinement “violates the human rights of the prisoners held
in solitary confinement;” and the international law group was told that critics argue
that the use of solitary confinement “violates international human rights treaties
that the United States has signed.” The idea is that the placebo group invoked the
idea of human rights generally without relying on a specific legal commitment,
thus making it possible to determine whether the existence of specific treaties—
as opposed to general norms—is what influences opinion. The results of the
survey suggested that there was no difference between the control and placebo
groups in their level of support for using solitary confinement, but that there was
a small but statistically significant difference with the international law treatment.
Respondents that received international law treatment were roughly four percent
more likely to support reforming the use of solitary confinement.

40

This summary only discusses on the primary manipulation in Wallace’s paper, but the paper also
includes two other treatments and a related second experiment. See Wallace, International Law and
Public Attitudes Toward Torture, supra note 6.

41

Chilton, supra note 6.
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B. Empathetic Enforcement
Several experiments have tested whether information on international law
makes respondents more likely to support efforts to change the policies of states
that violate human rights. For example, Putnam and Shapiro (2013) tested
respondents’ willingness to support economic sanctions against a foreign country
because of its human rights violations. 42 In a survey of American adults, Putnam
and Shapiro told respondents about the use of forced labor in Myanmar. After
being given varying amounts of information on the severity of the human rights
violations in Myanmar, respondents were also given different information about
the status of international law. The experiment suggested that information on
international law increased support for government sanctions, but did not increase
respondents’ willingness to say that they would personally boycott goods from
Myanmar. Although the complete findings of the experiment were mixed, the
authors did find qualified support for the idea that respondents learned that
human rights violations were against international law. 43
In another experiment that tests support for empathetic enforcement, Tomz
and Weeks examined factors that influence support for military intervention. 44 In
the survey, respondents were told about a hypothetical country developing nuclear
weapons. Respondents were randomly told about the country’s regime type—that
is, whether or not it was democratic—as well as about the country’s human rights
record. Half of the respondents were told that “[t]he country does not violate
human rights; it does not imprison or torture its citizens because of their beliefs,”
while the other half were told that “[t]he country violates human rights; it
imprisons or tortures some of its citizens because of their beliefs.” The
respondents were then asked about their willingness to support military strikes
against the country. The results suggest that respondents were dramatically more
likely to support military strikes when the country violated human rights.
Specifically, the experiment revealed a twenty-three percent increase in support
for military strikes against democracies that violate human rights, and a sixteen
percent increase in support military strikes against autocracies that violate human
rights.

42
43

44

Putnam & Shapiro, supra note 6.
In a related earlier study, Tomz, supra note 6, also tested whether respondents were willing to
support sanctions in response to human rights violations in Myanmar. The difference, however, is
that in the international law treatment, respondents were told that the sanctions would violate
international law. Tomz found that information on international law decreased support for the use
of sanctions by seventeen percent.
Tomz & Weeks, supra note 6.
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C. Treaty Body Pressure
At least one experiment has tested whether treaty body pressure increases
support for reforms aimed at improving human rights. Anjum, Chilton, and
Usman conducted an experiment in Pakistan that tested whether learning that
policy reforms aimed at improving women’s rights were proposed by the U.N.
increases support for the reforms. 45 In the experiment, roughly six hundred
subjects were recruited in Pakistan to take an in-person survey on women’s rights.
The respondents were asked whether they supported four reforms that the U.N.
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women recommended
that Pakistan should implement. Half of the subjects were told that the reforms
were proposed by the U.N., while half of the subjects were not told who proposed
the reforms. The results of the experiment revealed that learning that the U.N.
supported the reforms increased support for them. The results of the experiment
thus provide some evidence that when the U.N. supports a policy reform, it might
increase its domestic support.

D. NGO Advocacy
A recent experiment has also tested how international human rights law may
help with NGO advocacy. Hafner-Burton, LeVeck, and Victor conducted an
experiment with experienced NGO professionals that had experience working on
environmental issues and human rights. 46 For the human rights treatments, the
experiment asked the sample of NGO professions how much more difficult they
believed it would be to accomplish their advocacy goals if either the ICCPR (which
is a binding agreement) or the Universal Deceleration of Human Rights (which is
a non-binding agreement) did not exist. The results suggested that they believed
that their job would be more difficult if the laws did not exist, and that it would
be even more difficult if the binding ICCPR did not exist. Moreover, the
respondents indicated that the reason that their jobs would be particularly difficult
is that removal of the law would make litigation and accountability efforts more
difficult. These results thus provide evidence that NGO advocates at least believe
that the presence of international human rights law helps them to accomplish their
goals. 47
45

Gulnaz Anjum, Adam S. Chilton, & Zahid Usman, United Nations Endorsement & Support for Human
Rights: An Experiment on Women’s Rights in Pakistan, (U. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 563, Apr. 2016).
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Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Brad L. LeVeck, & David G. Victor, How Activists Perceive the Utility of
International Law, 78 J. POL. 167 (2016).
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For another experiment examining how International Law can be effectively used by advocates, see
Kayla Jo McEntire, Michele Leiby, & Matthew Krain, Human Rights Organizations as Agents of Change:
An Experimental Examination of Framing and Micromobilization, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 407 (2015).
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VI. F UTURE R ESEARCH AND C ONCLUDING T HOUGHTS
Although the experimental research on human rights has suggested that
information on human rights agreements may be able to change public opinion,
there are serious limitations to the studies that have been conducted to date. Most
notably, the fact that nearly all of the experiments on human rights have been
conducted using vignette studies with respondents in the U.S. seriously limits the
generalizability of the findings. 48 This method of research is still in its infancy,
however, and could learn a great deal from the more developed experimental
literatures in development economics, American politics, and international
relations. I will briefly outline three ways that future experimental studies on
human rights could improve on prior research.
First, experiments should be conducted in transitioning democracies. There
is little evidence to suggest that human rights treaties have improved the rights
practices of stable democracies or stable autocracies. Instead, the best available
evidence suggests that human rights agreements are most likely to change the
behavior of developing democracies. 49 That is, countries like those in Eastern
Europe or Central America that are not well-established, stable democracies, but
that have moved towards democracy in the last few decades. To date, however,
nearly all of the experiments on the effectiveness of human rights have been
conducted in the U.S. 50 This is a major shortcoming of the small experimental
literature on human rights because the U.S. is not only a stable democracy, but
also because Americans may have idiosyncratic views towards international
human rights agreements. There have been a large number of experiments
conducted by political scientists in developing countries in the last several years, 51
and there is a great deal that scholars interested in international human rights law
could learn from these efforts.
Second, experimental research should explore a wider range of topics. For
better or worse, 52 there are dozens of rights that are protected by international
human rights agreements. 53 One of the advantages of experimental research is that
48

But see Anjum, Chilton, & Usman, supra note 45.

49

SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 152–53.
See Chilton, supra note 6; Wallace, supra note 6; Putnam & Shapiro supra note 6; Tomz & Weeks,
supra note 6.
See, for example, Sarah Sunn Bush & Amaney A. Jamal, Anti-Americanism, Authoritarian Politics, and
Attitudes about Women’s Representation: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Jordan, 59 INT’L STUD. Q. 34
(2015); Graeme Blair, Kosuke Imai & Jason Lyall, Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime:
A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 679 (2013); Graeme Blair et al., Poverty
and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 679 (2013).
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51

52

POSNER, supra note 2, argues that including too many rights in international agreements may have
adverse consequences on rights protections.

53

See Chilton & Tingley, supra note 4, at 214.
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a study can be designed to test whether international commitments can increase
support for providing any right that is included within a treaty. Since observational
studies can only test the effectiveness of rights where cross-country data is
available, this is one comparative advantage of experimental research. This
advantage should be leveraged, and studies should be conducted to test whether
the impact that information has on international law is conditional on the nature
of the right at issue.
Third, scholars conducting experiments on human rights should start to
utilize field experiments. Although the survey experiments that have been
conducted provide new data on the influence of human rights agreements on
public opinion, it is not clear whether those differences in opinion translate into
meaningful changes in the respondents’ behavior, and in turn, into changes in
public policies. Researchers in a number of fields related to international law—
including international economic regulation, international relations, and
development economics—have begun to conduct field experiments to determine
whether experimental interventions result in changes to real world behavior. 54
These experiments are thus able to reduce the concern that using experimental
methods will produce internally valid results, but that they will not have any realworld applicability.
Of course, even if future experimental research on the effectiveness of
human rights law moves in the direction that I have outlined, it does not mean
that any one study will be able to definitely demonstrate whether human rights
treaties have improved human rights around the world. Instead, experimental
methods can produce evidence that complements empirical research using
observational data. This would make it possible to triangulate on the answer to
whether human rights treaties improve respect for rights.

54

See, for example, Michael G. Findley, Daniel L. Nielsen, & J.C. Sharman, Using Field Experiments in
International Relations: A Randomized Experiment of Anonymous Incorporation, 67 INT’L ORG. 657 (2013);
James D. Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, & Jeremy M. Weinstein, Can Development Aid Contribute to
Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia, 99 AM. ECON.
REV. 287 (2009); James Habyarimana et al., Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?,
101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 709 (2007).
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